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More than any other area, the metaphysics of memory reflects the pattern towards interdisciplinarity famous above, and work on this area sometimes shades into philosophy of psychology (Rowlands 2009) and philosophy of neuroscience (Bickle 2011). Related work in the philosophy of psychology is discussed here as appropriate; for more specialized work within the philosophy of neuroscience, see the entry on that topic. The central intention of mainstream analysis on the metaphysics of memory is to develop a theory of remembering: a general but informative account of what it is for someone to remember something. As we'll see, nonetheless, there are a number of kinds of memory. It's unclear whether or not it is feasible to develop a concept of remembering that applies to all of those, and ultimately it may prove essential to develop multiple theories of remembering, corresponding to the a number of sorts of memory. 2002), philosophers have singled episodic memory out for special consideration on the bottom that it provides the rememberer with a singular type of entry to past events.



For some, indeed, only episodic memory truly deserves the title "memory" (Klein 2015; B. Russell 1921). Reflecting this focus, this entry might be concerned primarily with theories of episodic remembering: accounts of what it's for somebody to remember an event from his personal previous. Due, perhaps, to their concentrate on episodic memory, philosophers have usually approached memory as a capacity exercised by single people. 1994; cf. Barash 2016; Michaelian & Sutton forthcoming) and which has recently given birth to the multidisciplinary field of memory studies (Roediger & Wertsch 2008; Segesten & Wüstenberg forthcoming). It has additionally come to include points arising from the more moderen tradition of analysis on external memory in cognitive science which views remembering by means of the lens of distributed (Hutchins 1995) or prolonged (Clark & Chalmers 1998) theories of cognition. Whereas the entry is worried primarily with particular person memory, these newer issues might be discussed as well.



Before turning to theories of episodic remembering, it is going to be helpful to situate episodic memory with respect to other sorts of memory. In its broadest sense, "memory" refers to the varied outcomes of the diverse forms of studying of which people and other brokers are succesful. Any modification of an agent’s behavioural tendencies as a result of its expertise thus probably counts as memory, making the class of memory very broad certainly. Despite the breadth of the class, nonetheless, MemoryWave Guide there may be an approximate consensus on a taxonomy of kinds of human memory. Philosophers generally distinguish among three primary kinds of memory. 1911) and Russell (1921), for instance, distinguished between habit memory and recollective memory, while Broad (1925) and Furlong (1951) further distinguished between recollective Memory Wave and propositional memory (cf. Ayer (1956; D. Locke 1971)). These distinctions align reasonably well with those drawn by a taxonomy which, originating in psychology, has increasingly grow to be standard in newer philosophy.



The taxonomy in query, developed in detail by Squire (2009), divides the overarching class of memory into declarative and nondeclarative memory. Declarative memory, in turn, is divided into episodic Memory Wave, corresponding roughly to recollective memory, and semantic memory, corresponding roughly to propositional memory. A primary cross at distinguishing episodic from semantic memory might be made by observing that the previous is anxious with the occasions of one’s private past specifically (e.g., MemoryWave Guide I remember speaking at a conference in Budapest), while the later is worried with the world on the whole (I remember that Budapest is the capital of Hungary). It is essential to note, however, that semantic memory can be typically involved with past events. One can have memories that concern occasions that one did not oneself experience (I do not forget that my colleague spoke at a workshop in Rome, although I didn't hear him converse); when one does, one remembers semantically, not episodically.